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THE SOCIAL SECURITY CONTROVERSY
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BRUNO STEIN
Professor of Economics and Director,
Institute of Labor Relations,
New York University
INTRODUCTION
As domestic political crisis go, the
Social Security crisis has had a rather long
run. The little monster made its first formal
appearance in the 1974 Annual Report of the
Trustees (1974), (1) and retained its ability
to generate headlines and political grief
until March 1983, when passage of the current
Amendments put it to rest, at least for the
time being. There is some measure of irony
here. The original Social Security Act of
1935 was a rather modest venture, as these
things go. Over time, the Act was expanded to
cover more people, insure against more contin-
gencies, and provide higher real benefits
(Munnell, 1977). Changes since 1977 are more
in the nature of reductions than growth, ex-
cept for coverage which is slightly expanded
by the 1983 Amendments. In 1972, Congress
added what were believed to be the final
touches to the structure. It provided an
ultimate boost in benefits and, to take Social
Security "out of politics", indexed the
benefit computation formula and the benefit to
price changes.
Two years later, things began to come
apart. The very possibility that Social Sec-
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urity could not continue functioning without
major changes had not been seriously contem-
plated by policymakers or the public since the
end of World War II. The notion that Social
Security could be soundly financed on a curr-
ent rather than on a fully funded basis had
become acceptable since the 1939 Amendments
had led to this change.(2) Each increment to
the law had been legislated with considerable
care. The political mechanism for effect-
uating changes had been built around the idea
of consensus, and involved interest groups
(including the program executives of the
Social Security Administration), legislators
who developed special knowledge, and admini-
strations which, regardless of political
party, were not unfriendly to Social Security
(Derthick, 1979).
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS
In order to understand the nature and
dynamics of the Social Security crisis, at
least with respect to cash benefit payments, a
few generally accepted principles must be
reviewed. (3) The first principle is that Soc-
ial Security is a set of promises for the fu-
ture, and the future is uncertain. The second
is that, at each point in time, taxes curr-
ently levied upon employers and workers are
largely used to pay current benefits to
claimants, i.e., the system pays as it goes.
That is to say, it is nt comparable to an
annuity contract under which an insurance
carrier receives premiums, invests them, and
guarantees an income stream to the annuitant
that is based on the amount of the premiums,
the expected rate of return on accumulated
premiums, and the life expectancy (or prob-
ability of other contingencies of the insured
group. In Social Security there is no kitty
full of cash to be paid out - no stock of
assets accumulated over a lifetime to be drawn
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down for retirement purposes.
Social Security promises are backed - if
that is the right word - by the future taxing
power of government. (4) So are government
bonds, but the owner of the bond has a con-
tractual right to payment which is protected
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The "buyer" of a Social Security "annuity" has
no comparable property right. His or her
rights are defined by statute and may be
changed by legislation. For example, in
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, the Supreme
Court said that "the non-contractual interests
of an employee (who had paid FICA taxes)
cannot soundly be analogized to that of the
holder of an annuity . . ." 363 U.S. 603, at
616. The case pheld a law depriving Comm-
unists and their dependents of benefits.
Hence, if promises made at an earlier point in
time cannot be kept, they can legally be
modified of eliminated by Congress.
A third principle, which follows from the
above, is that the taxing power of government
is constrained by the willingness and ability
of tax-payers to bear the burden of the tax.
Willingness and ability are not fully separ-
able concepts, but it is safe to say that they
are functionally related to the real incomes
of taxpayers. These, in turn, depend on the
ability of the economy to generate output,
preferably at a growing rate.
And there, of course, is the rub. The
economy began to slow down in the late 1096's,
but only hindsight showed that this was a
trend and not a cyclical aberration. There
were, to be sure, economists who worried in
the decline on growth of output per labor hour
from 2.96 percent in 1960-64 to 1.76 percent
in 1965-70 (Economic Report of the p_,idott
1982). The next two half decades saw further
declines in growth, including some years when
the decline was absolute rather than relative.
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Give or take some swings in the business
cycle, the 1970's were a decade of economic
stagnation, as evidenced by the data on growth
of real Gross National Product (3.88 percent
in the 1960's and 3.12 percent in the 1970's),
and more dramatically, by a decline in average
real weekly wages from $186.94 in the 1960's
to $164.97 in the 1970's (Economic Report of
the President, 1982). That's a decline of
close to 12 percent, and it is not trivial.
Taxes, however, are levied on nominal income,
not real income, and they began to hurt.
Let us now step back in time. During the
1950's and most of the 1960's, benefit levels
remained roughly in line with price changes,
being adjusted by ad hoc legislation from time
to time. Toward the end of that decade - just
when the economy was beginning to slow down -
real benefits began to rise. Nominal adjust-
ments in 1968 and 1970 were 13 percent and 15
percent respectively, or 30 percent for the
period when compounded. The Consumer Price
Index rose 16 percent during that time,
leaving a real benefit increase of 14 percent.
The 1972 Amendments, which were intended to
depoliticize Social Security by introducing
indexation in 1975, gave nominal benefits
another upward push of 20 percent, well above
the rate of inflation (Social Security
Bulletin, 1977-79). In short, the aged, sur-
vivors, and disabled got a larger slice of the
pie just about the time that the pie had
ceased to grow.
I am not prepared to argue that most or
at least many claimants did not need or
deserve these benefit increases. In the
1960's, benefits replaced 30 percent of the
earnings of the median wage earner retiring at
age 65, not counting dependents' benefits or
the tax free status of the benefit. By 1975
the corresponding figure was 40.4 percent
(Munnell, 1979). Social Security has been of
enormous importance in eliminating poverty for
all but a small segment of the aged. All I am
saying is that by the mid 1970's the Social
Security system had reached a point where it
could not keep its promises for the immediate
future, however virtuous these might have
been, without some change. Moreover, it had
become apparent that it would probably also
not be able to keep its promises to the
population cohorts born during the baby boom
that followed World War II.
The particular symptoms of the stagnation
of the 1970's (and early 1980's) were con-
current high rates of inflation and
unemployment. The financing of Social Sec-
urity was and is peculiarly sensitive to these
phenomena. The indexation of benefits to
prices, effective in 1975, caused outlays to
rise with inflation. Unemployment, in turn,
reduced revenues. If the system was to be
self-supporting, that is, if it could rely on
other sources of revenues, then the comb-
ination of unemployment and inflation had to
be deadly. And so it was.
In 1977, after much agonizing, Congress
responded to the threatened bankruptcy of the
OASI Trust Fund by increasing the scheduled
payroll tax increases, raising the maximum
taxable wage, and indexing the latter to aver-
age annual wages. Congress also corrected the
flaw in the benefit computation system that
drove benefits higher than intended. This
action involved a reduction in benefits for
new retirees, effective 1983, and for new
survivors and disabled claimants, effective in
1987. The last two groups were politically
weaker than the first. What it rejected is
also f interest: it did not accept the Car-
ter proposal to tax all of the employers' pay-
rolls, and it chose not to introduce funding
from general revenues. Finally, it did not
raise taxes enough to eliminate the actuarial




Within a couple of years it became
evident that the labors of Congress had been
insufficient. Short term projections of price
and wage changes, as well as unemployment, on
which the legislation was based, turned out to
have been wildly optimistic. The OASI Trust
Fund was again heading for extinction, and
would reach illiquidity levels by 1982.
However, the 1982 elections had now
drastically altered the consensual politics of
Social Security, mixing it with the politics
of the federal budget.
These politics called for sizable cut in
income taxes, which was legislated, increases
in defense spending, and compensating reduc-
tion in non-defense outlays in order to mini-
mize the size of the federal budget deficits.
Social Security is a rather large intem in the
unified federal budget, and the Administration
roposed to solve the Social Security crisis by
reducing the expenditure. This would also
have enabled it to reduce the size of future
budget deficits. Its package consisted of
twelve cuts and one item of cost increases.
The major cut, which led to an uproar , was a
reduction in benefits for new claimants at age
62, from 80 percent of the normal benefit to
55 percent, with corresponding reductions at
age 63 and 64 ( U.S. Congress, 1981).
Congress shuddered, and the package was
withdrawn.
This left Congress with the need to do
something - anything - in an atmosphere that
can be characterized as one of hysterical near
paralysis. The usual mechanism of amending
the Social Security Act had consisted of
having the House Ways and Means Committee
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draft a bill, negotiate with the Senate Fin-
ance committee, and produce a compromise
acceptable to Congress as a whole. This mech-
anism went down with the rest of the Committee
process. In its place was the budget recon-
ciliation process, long ignored until then.
The outcome was series of cuts aimed at
politically weak constituencies. Since this
was far from sufficient to solve the near term
crisis, let alone the lonr term problem,
Congress put off the day of reckoning by
authorizing the OASI Trust Fund to borrow from
the other two Trust Funds in 1982. (5) After
complex negotiations between Congressional
leaders and the Administration, a bipartisan
National Commission on Social Security Reform
was to be appointed and charged with making
legislative proposals to get everybody off the
hook. It succeeded.
THE CRISIS SUBSIDES
The policy options that existed had been
widely discussed and studied by a variety of
commissions, (6) think tanks, academics, and
others. No magical solutions were possible,
and few politically weak targets remained.
The business before Alan Greenspan's National
Commission, and for the Congress, was one of
how to apportion the pain among different
segments of the population, now and in the
future. In essence, the options that were
available were:
1. raising more revenues through the
payroll tax mechanism;
2. reducing benefits for present and
future claimants, relatively or
absolutely;
3. finding other revenue sources, e.g.
general revenues;
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4. devising some combination of the
above;
5. introducing some flexibility into
the financing mechanism to cope with
the possible future shocks.
The Commission's recommendations, Report
of the National Commission on Social Security
Reform, 1983, which Congress speedily adopted
(with only minor changes), consisted of all of
the above, except that general revenues play a
trivial part and are disguised as bookkeeping
changes. The major ones can be summarized as
follows:
Revenue Changes
Acceleration of the scheduled payroll tax
increases; coverage of new federal employees;
coverage of all non-profit institutions (most
are covered, but this prevents them from
leaving the system); prohibition of state and
local governments that opted into the system
from leaving it.
Benefit Changes
Postponement of cost-of-living adjust-
ments from June to December of each year;
taxing 50 percent of benefits of claimants
with threshold incomes of $25,000 (single
filers) or $32,500 (joint filers) and return-
ing these revenues to the Trust Funds; raising
the age at which full retirement benefits are
available to age 66 for workers who are
between 29 and 40 years old in 1983, and to
age 67 for those who are twenty years old now,
with a phase-in for those in between.
A "stabilizer", triggered by a fall in
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the ratio of assets to outlays in the combined
Trust Funds to 15 percent (20 percent after
1988), by which cost-of-living adjust-ments
are based on the lower price or wage
increases, with provision for catch-up
benefits should the ratio rise above 32
percent; a provision that the Trustees of the
Fund (the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor,
and Health and Human Services, plus two public
Trustees added by the 1983 Amendments) must
make recommendations to Congress in the event
that Trust Fund balances fall dangerously low.
(7)
As the foregoing shows, considerable
ingenuity went into the matter of distributing
the pain of revising Social Security. On the
revenue side, current and future workers (and
employers - depending on the incidence of the
tax) will pay more. Higher paid workers face
a continuation of higher tax rates and rising
maximum taxes. Future federal civil servants
also bear some pain, but most people in this
group probably do not know their future
vocation and thus are not yet in a position to
protest.
On the benefit side, the principal
suffers are young workers, who do not think
much about retirement, and workers who have
yet to enter the labor market or who have not
been born as yet. The higher retirement age
acts, on average, as a reduction in the
present value of future retirement benefits
for younger workers and their successors.
This is on top of the decreased rate of return
on their FICA tax "investment" that would
occur in any event as Social Security matures.
Current retirees also bear some of the burden
in terms of the deferral of the cost-of-living
adjustment. Upper income retirees absorb some
of the burden through the taxation of
benefits, a measure that is really a benefit
cut. The size of this last group is small,
but it will grow through time as inflation and
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higher wages push up pension incomes and
yields from capital. This group is hit twice,
since its members are likely to have had high
average indexed earnings over their work life,
and thus receive relatively lower benefits by
virtue of the benefit computation formula that
favors lower wage workers.
In short, although the pain of readjust-
ment has been spread broadly, Congress did not
miss the opportunity to place parts of it on
politically weak groups: young workers and
workers yet unborn; and the as yet relatively
small number of retirees who enjoy high
nominal incomes.
WHAT NEXT?
As seen above, Congress responded to the
financial crisis in the Social Security cash
transfer system by a combination of payroll
tax revenue increase, benefit reduction, and
provision for future emergencies. (8) The
Regan administration played a relatively pass-
ive role once it had agreed to the appointment
of the National Commission. At present
(1983), the financing crisis appears to be
over. What happens next? This question
involves speculation regarding both economics
and politics.
On the economic side, the reforms should
get the system through the rest of the 1980's-
at least, there is a good chance that it will.
In the decade or so that follows, the OASI
Trust Fund will build an enormous surplus as a
result of a shortfall in retirements, (the
1930's had a low birthrate) together with
higher total employment and the higher tax
rates. Whether or not it will survive the
years following 2010, without further change,
will depend on how closely the economic and
demographic assumptions about the future that
underlay the Amendments approximate reality.
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These assumption strike me as a bit opti-
mistic, but seventy-five year projections are
chancy, at best.
Politically, a number of possibilities
for change exist. The treatment of working
versus non-working spouses may assume greater
importance. Congress did not open this can of
worms, but provided for a commission to study
the problem. A second possibility is that
younger workers will become aware that they
will be paying in more and receiving less that
their predecessors. If so, pressures for
change may occur that can undo the revised
financial structure. The AFL-CIO, tradition-
ally a major lobbying power on Social Security
matters is unhappy with the extension of the
age of full benefit eligibility, and may
spearhead a drive to return it to age 65 when
the Trust Funds look healthier. Since the
higher age constitutes a major cost saving for
the long run, its abolition would require a
substantial change in the method of financing
the system. Unions of federal employees are
likely to lobby for a return to full exclusion
from Social Security. And, of course,
Medicare remains a financial time bomb.
In short, the problems of Social Security
are not likely to disappear. The 1983
Amendments are not the last word. Those
policymakers who once thought that a social
insurance system could be set up on a once-and
for-all basis, subject only to incremental
improvements, have learned a bitter lesson.
The future is uncertain, today's promises may
not be kept when tomorrow comes, and compacts
between generations are subject to amendment.
But then, nothing is forever.
NOTES
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(1) The trustees were, ex-officio, the
Secretaries of Health, Education and
Welfare (now Health and Human Services),
Labor, and Treasury. The 1983 Amendments
provide for two additional Trustees to be
appointed by the President. The 1974
Advisory Council on Social Security also
referred to the impending difficulties.
This is no coincidence, since both bodies
drew their information and analysis from
the same source, the program executives
of the Social Security Administration.
(2) For a discussion of the shift from more-
or-less full funding to pay-as-you-go
(i.e., current FICA taxes pay current
benefits) see Bruno Stein, "Funding
Social Security on a Current Basis: The
1939 Policy Change in the U.S." C.V.
Starr Center for Applied Economics, New
York University, Economic Policy Paper PP
04, 1982.
(3) Medicare, a transfer-in-kind to the aged
and disabled has some additional prop-
erties that complicate any analysis and
is best dealt with separately. Costs of
service delivery have been rising
sharply, and there appears to no end in
sight for this phenomenon. In this
paper, focus will be restricted to the
cash transfer programs of Social
Security.
(4) The promises of an annuity are ultimately
backed by the expected future earnings of
its portfolio of assets. Individual
items in that portfolio may fail to
deliver on the promise, hence the need
for the annuity writer to assemble a
diversified portfolio, prudently selec-
ted, on the hypothesis that most of the
assets will be sound.
(5) The major cuts included ending the
minimum benefit for new claimants, ending
student benefits under Survivors Insur-
ance, and ending the parents' benefit
under SI when the youngest child reaches
age 16 instead of 18 (Svahn, 1981).
(6) Such as the National Commission on
Social Security and the President's
Commission on Pension Policy, both of
which issued lengthy reports in 1981.
See Social Security in America's Future.
Final Report of the National Commission
o Social -Securit. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, March 12,
1981) and President's Commission on
Pension Policy, Coming of Age: Toward a
National Retirement income PQlicy.
(Washington: Government Printing Office,
February 26, 1981). For an analysis of
these reports, see Bruno Stein, "Changing
the American Retirement System," in
Dallas L. Salisbury, ed., Retiremnt
Income .and the Economy: Policy
Directions for the 80's. (Washington:
Employee Benefit Research Institute,
1981), pp. 11-39.
(7) For a convenient summary of the 1983
Amendments, see Social Security Admini-
stration, Office of Legislation and
Regulatory Policy, Legislative Bulletin
No. 98-15, March 28, 1983. A complete
text, including the differences between
the House and Senate versions, is found
in Congressional Record - House, March
24, 1983, pp. H1724-H1779.
(8) Changes were also made in the Medicare
reimbursement system in an effort to
contain costs. These changes will not
suffice to solve the Medicare financial
problem, and ay lead to a reduction in
the quality of service delivery. But
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